Since the Nineties, Beijing has spurned Washington’s invites to take part in nuclear arms management negotiations. Instead, it has expanded and modernized its arsenal: the nation’s estimated 500 nuclear warheads are on monitor to double by 2030. China’s advances, together with North Korea’s, has had knock-on results within the area. Despite U.S. safety assurances, a majority of South Koreans now need their nation to have its personal nuclear weapons, and Japan’s long-standing aversion to the bomb can be eroding. Asia is now on monitor to see a destabilizing arms race within the years forward.

If it acts rapidly, nonetheless, Washington can stem these worrying developments. In February, Beijing invited the world’s nuclear states to barter a “no first use” treaty. (The United States, which has greater than ten instances as many nuclear weapons as China, maintains a first-use possibility.) After so many rejected advances, the United States ought to welcome China’s overture to speak. If Beijing is ready to barter in good religion, Washington ought to reply in sort—and press for a broader arms management settlement.

Washington should have interaction in powerful, even coercive diplomacy, making it clear that Beijing faces a stark alternative: take part meaningfully in substantive negotiations or courageous a large U.S.-backed nuclear buildup in its personal yard. And if Chinese leaders decline to take action, Washington may start discussions with Seoul and Tokyo about nuclear-sharing preparations, in addition to transfer sooner to replace and enlarge its personal arsenal, channeling investments to its nuclear weapons protection industrial base.

Some observers may object to this powerful strategy, arguing that it'll contribute to nuclear proliferation. But there may be an instructive precedent for Washington’s use of coercion to convey states to the arms management negotiating desk. In 1983, Washington deployed nuclear-tipped Pershing II missiles in West Germany and ground-launched cruise missiles in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. Rather than prompting escalation, this aggressive transfer compelled Moscow to interact in diplomacy that led to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eradicated all intermediate-range forces from Europe.

Today, Washington ought to strengthen its missile defenses, and people of its allies, ramp up U.S. deployments of nuclear-armed submarines and nuclear-capable bombers, and pursue nuclear-sharing preparations with Seoul and Tokyo. Just as such strikes drove the Soviet Union to the bargaining desk prior to now, they might persuade China to barter sooner or later.